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Preface
Monetary control in post-war Japan has not been carried out by means
of textbook-like or traditional methods at alL
It has been the core of the system of monetary control in post-war
Japan for the Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko or Nichi-gin) to set Bank
Rate below call rates and ration funds among city banks (Toshi-ginkoh or
To-ginO)) on the ground .of excess demand from To-gin, the excess
demand being the outcome of the 'low Bank Rate'. Changing Bank Rate,
buying & selling bonds, and the reserve deposit system have all been
made use of as the supporting or subsidiary instruments to credit
rationing.
( 1) To-gin are the bigger ones among common banks. They have their head offices in
a few of the largest cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya), and spread their branch network
all over the country. At present 12 are enumerated as To-gin, including The Bank
of Tokyo, the special bank for foreign exchange. Among common banks those
which keep their head offices in prefectural capitals are called Chihoh Ginkoh or
Chi-gin. Their business is, more or less, limited to regional areas. They are much
smaller in size compared with To-gin.
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But, when we read Hundred Years of the Bank of Japan (Nihon
Ginkoh Hyakunen-shi, 6 vols. with 1 vol. of supplementary materials,
1982-1986), no clear explanation is found of why and how this 'low Bank
Rate' came to take root. In particular, while the question whether this
policy (i. e. the low Bank Rate) was promoted by the Bank or by the
government seems to be important, no historical explanation thereof can
be found.
It is the aim of this research note only to ralse this question and
examine its importance. To get the final answer further investigation will
be required.
(l) Outline of the Method of the Monetary Control In
post-war Japan
Monetary control in post-war Japan has, basically, been carried out by
means of credit rationing based on an artificial cheap-money policy.
~
In capital markets, the cheap-money policy took the form of controlling
the yields of newly-issued government bonds, together with long-term
credit banks' bonds (Kin-yuh-sai(2)), and long-term prime rate(3), while
credit rationing, supported by the cheap-money policy, appeared typically
( 2) Kin-yuh-sai is a bond which only long-term credit banks can issue. They issue two
kinds of Kin-yuh-sai. One is Waribiki-sai (discountable bond), which matures after
one year from issue. The other is Ritsuki-sai (coupon bearing bond) which matures
after five years from issue. Ritsuki-sai is much more important than Waribiki-sai.
Credit banks raise money through these bonds and lend it to big firms for long
periods, which constitutes their main business.
( 3) Long-term prime rate is that which is applied by long-term credit banks, trust
banks, and life insurance companies when they lend money to big firms.
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as the control of newly-issued private bonds.
In short-term funds markets, the cheap-money policy took the form of
controlling the rates of deposit (both of banks and of the postal savings
system(4») and bank lending, which has its legal ground in the Temporary
Interest Rates Arrangement Act (Rinji Kinri Chohsei Hoh or Rin-kin-hoh)
in Dec. 1947. The cheap-money policy, in the sphere of short-term funds
matkets, also fixed Bank Rate below call rates (let us call it the 'low
Bank Rate' as we already did above).
Meanwhile, credit rationing, between the Bank and' To-gin, took the
form of adjusting the degree of restraint on lending(5) and of the credit
ceiling system (Kashidashi Gendogaku Seido)(6), which was supported by
~
the 'low Bank Rate'. The Bank also intervened between To-gin and
industrial & commercial firms, having To-gin ration credit by means of
checking the increase of their lending to the latter. (Kashidashi
Zohkagaku Kisei or Madoguchi Kisei(7))
Hitherto, when the Bank intended to tighten the call money market, it
supplied, by means of purchasing bonds from banks(8) (mainly from
e4) In Japan, the weight of postal savings in total national savings is very large. Out
of a total of 405 billion (English billion) yen of outstanding national savings at the
end of 1989, postal savings accounted for 133 billion yen.
e5) This is the subject of this research note. It means that the Bank adjusts the
degree of restraint on lending. Y. Suzuki expresses it as the 'strength of credit
rationing'.
e6) A system under which the Bank fixes a credit ceiling to each To-gin and controls
them by adjusting the margin between the ceiling and its lending outstanding to
them.
e7) Madoguchi Kisei means that the Bank advises each city bank to limit the latter's
lending to firms to a certain level, say within 105% of the sum lent in the same




To-gin), only a small part of the amount of the Bank notes increase
which was estimated to be necessary or adequate in the near future. By
doing so, the Bank forced To-gin to rely upon its lending. Having thus
arranged the stage, the Bank faced the strong demand for money from
To-gin in a restraining manner. Thus the Bank was able to tighten the
money market efficiently.
As Bank Rate was always fixed below call rates, it was wise for To-gin
to rely on Bank lending first, instead of last, when they were confronted
with any pressure for money. Faced with demand for borrowing from
To-gin, if the Bank, on one hand, suppresses new borrowing require-
ments, and collects former lendings on the other, the liquidity of To-gin
will be reduced, the money market being efficiently tightened.
Thus making use of the circumstances that there remained excess
demand for funds on the part of To-gin, the Bank was able to ration
funds to them. This is the 'credit rationing'. As the Bank rationed funds
where excess demand existed, monetary control was quite efficient in
Japan.
The reason why there was excess demand is due, directly, to the
technique of monetary control explained above (the low Bank Rate). But
the basic reason for excess demand was that in the real economy high
growth lasted for a long time and there was always vigorous demand for
funds on the part of manufacturing and commercial firms.
The description above is now widely known. But once we proceed to
(8) Operations in Japan are not conducted in the open market. They are carried out
between the Bank and each city bank rather in a face-to-face manner. Not
everybody can take part in the dealing, Further the vehicle 'is not TB but long-term
government bonds and government-guaranteed bonds.
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inquire into the reason for and the promoter of the 'low Bank Rate'
policy, we notice that some important questions remain unsolved. In this
research note, we would like to raise the following two questions about
the low 'Bank Rate' which is the core of the cheap-money policy and
credit rationing. These questions are:
CD Why was Bank Rate fixed low? Was it necessary at any cost m
order to enforce the cheap-money policy consistently ?
@ Did the 'low Bank Rate' take root by the intention of the Bank or
by that of the government ? Did it aim at improving the efficacy of
monetary control and at strengthening the authority of the Bank?
Or was it only an 9utcome of the government's wish to encourage
economic growth and to discharge the budgetary burden ?
Let us start with CD first.
(2) Regulation of Interest Rates on Deposit & Lending and
the 'low Bank Rate'
Putting the 'low Bank Rate' aside, the regulation of interest rates
appears in two places. One is deposit & lending markets, and the other is
capital (long-term fund) markets. Let us examine the relation between
deposit rates regulation and the 'low Bank Rate' first.
As described above, the 'low Bank Rate', linked with credit rationing,
is a powerful instrument for monetary control. But logically it is not
necessarily associated with the regulation of rates of deposit. Even if the
latter are regulated, it is possible for the Bank to put Bank Rate above
call rates, thus making it penalty rate for To-gin.
In this case, if the Bank tightens the money market, call rates which
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are not regulated will rise relatively higher than deposit & lending rates.
To-gin will only rely on the Bank when it is indispensable for them to
take Bank money which bears a penalty rate higher than call rates.
Credit squeezing here will have an effect on the market not through
liquidity but through cost.
Thus regulating deposit rates does not necessarily require the 'low Bank
Rate'. This is clear from the fact that, in the U. S. up to Dec. 1983 where
the upper limit of deposit rates were regulated by the Glass-Steagall Act
in 1933, the ralation between Bank Rate and Federal Funds rate was not
fixed: i. e. in the U. S. Bank Rate was not always placed below money
market rates as it was in Japan(9).
Then how about the ralation between the interest rates on bank
lending and the 'low Bank Rate' ? There has been a controversy
concerning the effectiveness of fixing the upper limit of the lending
rates.
In Japan the upper limit has been regulated by Rin-kin-hoh. But in
addition To-gin introduced a short-term prime rate as their self-imposed
control since 1959, which they fixed a little above Bank Rate and made it
work together with the latter(lO). Short-term prime rate became the
( 9) Also, in the U. S., even if Bank Rate is lower than the Federal Funds Rate, the
rules and formalities on borrowing from the Bank are so troublesome that member
banks are not always eager to take money from the Bank. (B. M. Friedman,
Monetary Policy in the United States: Design and Implementation, 1981, Chap. 3,
B)
(IO) The self-imposed rule on short-term prime rate was altered in Jan. 1989. The new
rule prescribed that the new prime rate would be placed at a level based on a
market-basket rate which was composed of some regulated rates and some free
rates as well.
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lower limit of lending rates. Also the upper limit of lending rates came to
be controlled by their self-regulation. Superficially the ceiling of the
self-controlled lending rates seemed to be regulated by the Rin-kin-hoh
limit. But the regulation by the law could not be said to be powerful,
because sometimes the Rin-kin-hoh limit was changed following the
self-imposed limit.
Moreover To-gin forced borrowing firms to deposit Buzumi & Ryoh-da-
teo~ is a kind of compulsory deposit which is required when a
commercial bill is discounted. A part of the money discounted must be
deposited. Ryoh-date is a similar kind of deposit when a loan is given to
~
a firm. By using such technique banks can raise the effective interest
rates on lending when they lend money to private firms.
Because there are such circumstances as above, there was a
controversy whether the cheap money policy was carried through III
lending markets as well as in the deposit market. But regardless of the
result of this controvesy, we can infer that the lending rates will not
require the 'low Bank Rate'. The regulation of lending rates is tied up
with that of the deposit rates. So even if banks suffer loss because
lending rates are fixed artificially low, they will be able to make it up by
fixing the deposit rates low.
Thus it is almost certain that fixing lending rates low would not bring
about the 'low Bank Rate'.
Though the regulation of interest rates on deposit & lending does not
necessarily require the 'low Bank Rate', doesn't that of the interest rates
in capital market require it ? In Japan, the interest rates on Kin-yuh-sai,
private bonds, and long-term prime rate were also regulated on the basis
of the regulation of government bond rates. Doesn't this situation
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necessitate the 'low Bank Rate' ? Let us examine this question next.
(3) Long-term Interest Rates and the 'low Bank Rate': the
analysis by ]. Teranishi
It is ]. Teranishi who argued most strongly that the regulation of
long-term interest-rates requires the 'low Bank Rate,oj).
He divided the regulated financial markets in Japan into three(2), i. e.
the long-term funds market, the Bank lending market, and the deposit
market. Paying full attention to their mutual relations which are not one
way, he concludes finally that basically it is the need to regulate the
long-term funds matket that gave rise to the regulation in the Bank
lending and deposit markets.
Hitherto the yields of government bonds, local government bonds,
Kin-yuh-sai, private firms' bonds, have been fixed artificially low by the
government's cheap money policy. The government half-forced To-gin to
hold these bonds, which, Teranishi argues, was equal to levying a tax on
To-gin. In order to persuade To-gin to hold them, he says, it was
indispensable to lower Bank Rate and thus offset the implicit tax.
If so, in so far as the above discussion is concerned, neither To-gin nor
the government did not gain anything from the cheap money policy. It
was neutral with regard to their interests(3). Thus "the main purpose of
(1) ]. Teranishi, Japan's Economic Development and Money & Banking CNihon no
Keizai-hatten to Kin-yuh, 1wanami, Tokyo, Japan, 1982)
(2) Teranishi says that the short-term lending market is not regulated in reality,
because the short-term lending rate is basically decided by a self-imposed rule, on
one hand, and there is a forced convention of Buzumi and Ryoh-date, on the other
hand. (pp. 453, 508)
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the artificial cheap money policy was, above all, to promote the process
of high growth which was driven forward mainly by plant and equipment
investment by the private sector"(l4).
That is to say, according to Teranishi, the very aim of the cheap
money policy was neither to lighten the debt charge of the government
nor to help banking firms but to supply industrial & commercial firms
with low~cost capital which was necessary for high economic growth(l5).
To regulate long~term interest~rates was, indeed, indispensable to such a
cheap money policy.
In short, according to Teranishi's analysis, in so far as the long~term
funds market is regulated by the cheap money policy, the 'low Bank
Rate' will be almost inevitable. Returning to the question <D raised
before, his answer would be that "in order to enforce cheap money policy
consistently, it was indispensable to fix Bank Rate low."
Now in regard to Bank lending, Teranishi takes another point of view.
That is the 'passiveness' of Bank lending, which means that when the
Bank faces borrowing demand from To~gin, it will almost automatically,
i. e. without exercising its discretion, accept their demand. Teranishi says
that hitherto the way of giving credit by the Bank has been based on
(13) But he adds that To~gin gain by deposit rates regulation which is the corollary of
long-term rates regulation (p.494).
(14) pp. 495-496
(15) This is a conclusion which comes out of his analysis that the government will
gain nothing from the cheap money policy because the reduction of debt charges
must be cancelled out by the decrease of National Treasury receipts which should
have come from the Bank. But he adds that there can be a gap between subjective
motive and objective effect, so that the original intention of the gevernment to
reduce debt charges through the cheap money policy does not have to be disallowed
com pletely. (pp. 486-487, 496)
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this passiveness. He adds that "it would be the only policy rule that could
be chosen" on the premise of pursuing high economic growth which
includes an artificial cheap money policy (p. 592).
Concerning the relation between the regulation of long-term fund rates
and the 'low Bank Rate', it would be safe, having learned from
Teranishi's study, to say as follows:
The artificial cheap money policy cannot help containing the 'low Bank
Rate' in its framework. The promoting factor is, so far as we observe
'directly', not the regulation of short-term fund rates but that of long-term
fund rates. Here it does not matter so much whether the motive of the
regulation of long-term fund rates includes not only supplying industries
of low-cost funds but also reducing the budgetary charge on the
government. (Here the word 'directly' implies that we have not examined
such a detour-logic as 'necessity of regulating deposit & lending rates ->
necessity of regulating long-term fund rates -> low Bank Rate')
(4) Promoter of the 'low Bank Rate'
Now on the question @ raised above (i. e. the origin and promoter of
the 'low Bank Rate'), Teranishi does not say anything.
He stresses the 'passiveness' of Bank lending. But, needless to say, the
Bank has not always accepted the demand for funds from To-gin. In
other words, it has not accepted the demand in the manner expected by
the extreme Banking School. The Bank often drove To-gin into reliance
on itself using the 'low Bank Rate' as its weapon. In such a situation, the
Bank has suppressed the borrowing demand from To-gin (credit
rationing). Such 'activeness' of Bank lending Teranishi does recognize, of
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course.
But for Teranishi the logic of 'low issuing yields of bonds ---> necessity
of subsidies to To-gin !is compensation ---> low Bank Rate' appears on the
front of the stage. And, we consider, the occasions where the Bank
displays its 'activeness' seem to be put in the rear. If we concentrate our
attention on the fact that, roughly speaking, monetary control displayed
distinctive features in post-war Japan compared with other advanced
countries, to stress only the passiveness of Bank lending might be
misleading.
When we regard the effectiveness of monetary control and the
activeness of Bank lending as important, there will be a question: wasn't
it that the 'low Bank Rate' was not merely a link in the cheap money
policy of the government but also a deliberately chosen policy of the
Bank itself in order to control the financial world ?
The question that the 'low Bank Rate' might be a policy which the
Bank, along with the government, itself chose is nearly equivalent to the
question whether the 'low Bank Rate' was promoted by the government
or by the Bank.
When we read the 5th and 6th volumes of Hundred Years of the Bank
of Japan, bearing the above question in mind, we notice a curious fact.
That is to say, this question is neither raised nor answerd. In particular it
is a little perplexing that m several sections where such subjects as the
over-loan phenomenon(l6), the penalty-rate bearing lending ceiling system
(16) 'Over-loan' is an English word coined in Japan which means the following: as city
banks lend heavily to private firms meeting the vigorous demand from the latter
(the latter being in over-borrowing), their lending tends to exceed the availability of
funds, so that they always resort to the Bank in order to make up the deficit.
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(~17»), and the call market are described, nothing
special is said about the origin and the promoter of the 'low Bank Rate'
policy.
Is it that the question is not important ? But the 'low Bank Rate',
which is the key to the credit rationing at the Bank vs. To-gin stage,
cannot be a trifle.
Is the 'low Bank Rate' not an outcome of any policy but an economIc-
ally natural phenomenon to begin with ? Namely, is there an economic
climate where call rates naturally rise above Bank Rate at whatever level
the Bank might set its rate ? Accordingly is it not proper, from the
beginning, to raise this question ? As we have seen before, however, it is
possible to adopt a policy which makes Bank Rate thoroughly follow the
money matket and sets it a little above call rates. As it was inadequate,
for some reason or other, to adopt this policy, the government and (or)
the Bank must have chosen the 'low Bank Rate'. Then why do they not
explain the reason they took this way ?
Indeed, if this policy is nothing but a mere continuation from the
pre-war period, it might be useless to mention its origin and promoter
again, but it was usual in the pre-war period that Bank Rate was higher
than call rates(l8). Moreover, it is said that about after the adoption of
(17) A kind of irregular Bank Rate policy, which was used up to 1955. Under the
system, the Bank fixed one or two ceiling line(s) on its lending to each bank. If a
bank's borrowing, excluding some preferred sorts such as discounting short-term
commercial bills or borrowing on foreign trade bills, reached the ceiling, the Bank
charged a higher penalty rate. But really the supposed penalty rate became ordinary
Bank Rate, superficial Bank Rate having become a preferential rate ... especially to
foreign trading companies. (The system remained even after 1955 until 1963, but its
character was changed then and it returned to one involving a penalty.)
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the gold standard system in 1897, city banks came to feel ashamed when
they borrowed from the Bank(l9). Even in war-time call rates stood higher
than Bank Rate(20). So the 'low Bank Rate' policy was not an u~critical
continuation from the pre-war period but must be one that was started,
at some time in the post-war period, bearing the intention of some part
of society, and then took root. When, by whose intention, and for what
purpose was it started ?
Returning to Hundred Years of the Bank of Japan again, there is no
part that clearly answers such a question. On page 91 vol. 6, it refers to
the remark by T. Yoshino(21), "if we intend to use the Bank's lending
policy as a powerful instrument for control from now on in order to attain
a stable economic growth, the dissolution of over-loan cannot be taken
lightly." (His remark was given at a round-table talk reported in Shuh-kan
Toyo Keizai, 4 and 11 Mar. 1961)
On this remark, Hundred Years comments, "this remark pointed out a
problem which the Bank was rather definitely conscious of, when it
considered the over-loan problem from the view of strengthening the
ability of monetary control." But this is too brief to explain its intention
concerning the 'low Bank Rate' policy.
Further on pages 97-100, the difference of opinion In the Bank on
(18) Hundred Years of the Bank of Japan, supplementary volume, 1986, pp.424-433.
Concerning the history of the call market, see also S. Goto, Development of
Short-term Money Markets in Japan: A History (Nihon Tanki Kin-yuh Shijoh
Hattatsu-shi, Nihon Keizai Hyoh-ron Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1986)
(19) S. Goto, op. cit. , p. 101
(20) Hundred Years, ibid.
(21) T. Yoshino is also an economist from the Bank. As he has written so many
books, I have to give up, for the present, judging whether he has explained
somewhere fully the origin and the promoter of the 'low Bank Rate'.
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Monetary Normalization is revealed. [see foot note (25) of this research
note] But it is not clear how this difference relates to the Bank's policy
before and after that time.
Putting the Bank itself aside, how do economists from the Bank
answer this question? B. Kure(22), in his book Financial World in Japan
(Nihon no Kin-yuh-kai, Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, 1981), says, "the system
for To-gin to rely on the Bank makes call rates always higher than Bank
Rate. If this condition is left uncorrected, it IS impossible to lower call
rates below Bank Rate. Though we know it well, as the matter IS
concerned with the attitude of people (To-gin ... Ichinose), namely a
matter of mental posture, we cannot find out the way of correction.
What the Bank has done so far was nothing but preaching repeatedly."
(p. 252) or "connected with the Bank lending policy, call rates have stood
at a level usually higher than Bank Rate" (p. 245), and "the Bank has
been critical to the fact that call rates are higher than Bank Rate and
that call loan is regarded as a way of investment rather than the reserve
for payment. The Bank regarded the correction of these conditior:s as the
object of Monetary Normalization (Kin-yuh-Seijoh-ka). But it did not take
any effective step for normalization." (p.246)
The first and the third remarks can be regarded as calling firstly the
attitude of To-gin into question and secondly the responsibility of the
Bank which will not correct the situation (leaving an important problem
unsolved). The second remark seems to be inconsistent with this. That is
to say, it suggests that the 'low Bank Rate' is the policy of the Bank
(22) Another important book of his is Monetary Policy.(Kin-yuh Seisaku, Toyo Keizai
Shimpo Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1973)
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(not an abandonment but a positive intention). His saying around here is
not easy to understand. But as a whole his assertion can be taken as
follows: the 'low Bank Rate' originated as the result of the behavior of
To-gin: and after a certain consideration, the Bank left the 'low Bank
Rate' uncorrected: this is the way the 'low Bank Rate' was born.
But still it is not explained clearly why the Bank did not normalize the
situation, or, in other words, why the 'low Bank Rate' has been
maintained.
Y. Suzuki says, In his book(23), as follows concerning Monetary
Normalization in the middle of the 1950's: raising Bank Rate in 1957 could
not help being insufficient given the policy atmosphere at the time.
"Thus, the level of Bank Rate was low compared with the penalty rate
of the second ceiling of the former Kohritsu Teki-yoh Seido. It became
much lower than the equilibrium level which was to balance demand for
and supply of the Bank lending. Under these circumstances, the lending
policy since 1955 was started, which adjusts the strength of 'credit
rationing' to To-gin through 'day to day guidance to their financing' and
the 'assessment of their lending to firms' as well." (pp.175-176)
In Suzuki's explanation, we find that the 'low Bank Rate' seems to
have been adoped, at least deliberately, since about 1957. On the question
why it was adoped, he merely answers with the word 'the policy
atmosphere at the time', but it is not clear whether the atmosphere
refers to the Bank's or the Treasury's. Nor is it clear whether it was
(23) Y. Suzuki, Money and Banking in Contemporary japan (Gendai Nihon
Kin-yuh-ron, Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1974) Another important book
of his is Effects of Monetary Policy (Kin-yuh Seisaku no Kohka, Toyo Keizai
Shimpo Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1966)
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adoped on the ground of the Treasury's cheap money policy or because
of the intention of the Bank to keep strong powers for monetary control.
A. Kuroda, in his Financial Market in Contemporary Japan (Toyo
Keizai Shimpo Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1988 )(24) inquires into the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, using the 'activeness and passiveness of
the Bank lending' as his key words when he analyzes short-term financial
markets.
But he does not mention the origin and promoter of the 'low Bank
Rate', either. On this point he only says briefly, "As Bank Rate in our
country usually remains lower than call and bills rates, lending is given at
the option of the Bank in the form of credit rationing, so that it has been
the most mobile instrument for credit control." (p. 27)
Conclusion
So far as we have seen, neither Hundred Years by the Bank nor the
economists from the Bank can be said to have given a clear explanation
about the 'low Bank Rate'. Let us repeat the question again. Why and by
whose intention was it started and did it take root 7 Was it only a link in
the government's cheap money policy or the embodiment of the Bank's
own intention to devise an efficient weapon for monetary control ?
It seems to me a little perplexing that on this fundamental question no
clear explanation is found at least in Hundred Years. The'low Bank
Rate', I infer, seems to be not only a result of the government's cheap
(24) Another important book of his is The Term Structure of Interest Rates in
Japan. (Nihon no Kinri Kohzoh, Toyo Keizai Shim po Sha, Tokyo, Japan, 1982)
-252-
Why is Bank Rate below call Rates in Japan? 629
money policy but also the consequence of the Bank's wish to maintain
the power over monetary contro[(25l.
If this is proved, the common vIew will have to be modified or
supplemented that the cheap money policy in post-war Japan has been
motivated by the government's wish to pursue high economic growth and
low debt charge at the same time. This verification is the next task.
(25) Here we might have to bear in mind that there were two streams of thoughts in
the Bank concerning the attitude to monetary control, one being 'controllism', the
other being 'marketism', as it were. (Hundred Years, vol. 6, pp.97-100)
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